By Mark Hayes
A considered analysis of primary source materials reveals that NA articulated an uncompromising version of Nazi ideology, and the group engaged in high profile activities that captured the attention of the mainstream and social media. Moreover, NA had a propensity for violence which led, not only to street confrontation, but to the expression of certain paramilitary pretensions. The rise of groups like National Action is indicative of the on-going threat posed by groups who refuse to relinquish their adherence to the Nazi creed. Such was the impact made by National Action it led to the organisation being proscribed under the terms of āanti-terroristā legislation in Britain. It is now a criminal offence to be a member of National Action, participate in its meetings or support the organisation in any way. This judicial intervention effectively ended the organisation in its chosen form, although it is highly likely that it will re-emerge elsewhere, in another guise.
In fact National Action claimed to be at the forefront of a ānew waveā of fascist activism in Britain and it is interesting to note that NA represented an explicit rejection of the recent āpopulistā trend, identifiable in fascist politics across Europe in recent years. The attempt to achieve political success by toning down the fascist message, while complying with constitutional methods and adopting a radical right-wing agenda, has been the predominant modus operandi in the contemporary era. In Britain, for example the British National Party (BNP) expended some considerable energy trying to become ārespectableā and electorally viable whilst concealing its inner ideology, which was nevertheless still identifiably fascist. In this sense the fascists leading the BNP were deliberately trying to camouflage their ideological perspective with a more āpopulistā discourse which focused on the issue of preserving British culture and identity. However, the BNP, despite making an initial electoral impact at a local level, was unable to sustain its success, and the far right in Britain today is disunited, consisting of a variety of much smaller disparate elements.
Indeed the origins of National Action lay in the spectacular collapse of the British National Party (BNP) which imploded after its electoral ambitions were forestalled in 2010. The dramatic demise of the BNP, which once held over 50 local council seats, effectively released a relatively large number of right-wing activists into the ideological ether, with some seeking a return to a more robust articulation of Nazi aspirations. The immediate forerunner of National Action, it could be argued, was English National Resistance, led by former BNP activists Kieran Trent and Matthew Tait, but its origins might also be found in other micro-groups like Islands of the North Atlantic (IONA), the Traditional Britain Group and the Integralist Party. Internet discussion groups like āWestern Springsā were also significant in providing a forum where far right activists could gather to exchange ideas and examine how unreconstructed fascists might re-group and recalibrate their political praxis. National Action was one outcome of this process of critical self-examination on the fringes of fascist politics in Britain. Significantly, at the outset, the ādrunken yobsā that appeared to coalesce around the ācentristā English Defence League (EDL) were rejected by NA as a ācharadeā, and it also unambiguously dismissed the failed electoral strategy of the BNP as a āvanity projectā. National Action therefore set itself the task of distancing itself from both single-issue protest politics and constitutional methods.
So National Action had no apparent interest in conventional politics or developing a āpopulistā agenda, but constituted a straightforward, single-minded determination to return to the rigorous first principles of hard-line Nazism. As one of the more recent manifestations of fascism in Britain, NA certainly attracted some sustained attention from the media, which became fascinated by its unapologetic and uncompromising defence of Nazi ideology. Of course, there is a tendency in the media to exaggerate their coverage of āextremismā for its own purposes, however (moral panics notwithstanding) the media nevertheless identified some of the more extraordinary elements which characterised NA. What was considered new and threatening about NA as a phenomenon was the groupās unconcealed admiration Hitler, its links to violent terrorists, and the new propaganda tactics deployed. Indeed, it might be argued that in some ways National Action represented a new style of fascist activism in Britain.
Origins
National Action was formed in 2013 as a semi-clandestine group advocating the neo-Nazi ideology of ārevolutionary nationalismā. In fact, NA members saw themselves as the faithful soldiers of the original National Socialist credo. The emphasis within NA was on practical activism and ideological purity in order to produce what it called āan exciting new interpretation of nationalismā. Benjamin Raymond (Noyles) and Alex Davies (a former member of the BNPās youth wing) became the most identifiable āleadersā of the new group, which held its first conference in 2015. The unambiguous aim of the organisation was to return to a particular conception of national socialist ideology, as articulated originally by Adolf Hitler, whilst ostentatiously eschewing more conventional efforts at political activity, particularly elections. Electoral politics, according to NA, inevitably resulted in the dilution of long cherished political ideals. The objective was, in short, to precipitate a paradigmatic shift in neo-Nazi political values on the far right and in the process, as the NA website put it, produce āa cohesive nationalist youth cultureā.
In essence National Action had a very particular political purpose, as the NA website proclaimed: āNational Action is a National Socialist youth organisation which means our clientele are clean, intelligent, and ambitious people typically in their late teens or twenties. It is a scene for young Nationalists to network, engage socially, and be creative at a time when there is no prospect for a political successā. As the NA āStrategy and Promotionā document explained: āWe have been presented with an opportunity for this project as our market exploits a doldrum period in nationalism where there is no clear nationalist party to get behindā. The overall objective was put, quite succinctly: āour whole strategy places value on the public expression of a hard line and determined ideologyā. The timing was right, NA argued, to return to primary principles. Moreover nationalists, according to NA, should never compromise on their convictions because āthe arrival of fascism in the 20th century was the greatest event in world historyā¦It is not an empty task we now undertake in reviving itā.
The organisation itself only numbered in the hundreds, but it was growing rapidly and consisted of committed neo-Nazi activists from across Britain, although the biggest area of strength was considered to be the North West. National Action activists saw themselves as an organisation of elite āstormtroopersā, which was emphatically ānot for plebsā. The emphasis was also on attracting younger recruits, and there was an informal age limit of 35. This emphasis on youth was self-evidently designed to facilitate a vibrant and creative cultural milieu. As NA documentation put it: āyouth is more than just a demographic ā it is the basis of having a āsceneāā. The group emphasised the need to attract nationalist āheroesā who have the vision, not only to construct a network of cadres but, as they put it, ābuild a war machine that can tear through the tired institutions and rip them into bloody shredsā. Moreover, NA was designed to purvey neo-Nazi nationalism, not just as a set of ideas, but as a āway of lifeā, a culture and a lived experience. National Action therefore aimed to provide a secure space for Neo-Nazi activists to exchange ideas and interact, in order to generate a vigorous and effective neo-fascist network.
In order to convey its message NA utilised the most evocative imagery, whilst professionally produced graphics were designed to create an immediate emotional impact which was focused primarily on alienated white youth in Britain. The NA Website, which started in September 2013, aimed to attract attention and antagonise political adversaries. Lurid images and provocative language featured prominently (āwe are going to gas sub-human communist scumā) and this was combined with heavily edited footage of their practical activities. Interventions on the website were invariably confrontational, racist and virulently anti-Semitic. Self-evidently NA traded in extravagant, theatrical bravado on the blogosphere, whilst attempting to offer explicit access to excitement and adventure via participation in their so-called āwhite jihadā. Internet forums and the ādark webā were also used explicitly to attract potential recruits (NA had facebook, tumblr and twitter accounts) and, according to NA, it alone possessed the ācourageā to pioneer a very aggressive form of agitprop which was āirreverentā and āextremeā because āhardcore propagandaā suited its purpose as an organisation. As NA confirmed: āwhether we are pitching this idea to other Nationalists or to the public we need our words to come in hammer blowsā.
Position
The objective of National Action was to build an organisation that was resilient and determined, and able to command respect. To achieve this NA required people who possessed not only ideological commitment but, crucially, the capacity to fight. National Action stressed the need for participants who were much more committed than mere āfollowersā. The members had to become the āfighting elementā which would āremain pureā in their adherence to their āpolitical religionā: āOnly a movement of strength lives in appreciation for the task of survival and the victory that will come. Only when you establish a power relationship with your enemies do you exist in a state of struggle and have any bargaining powerā. As Raymond put it: āone day there will be a time for civilised discussion maybe, but we canāt do that until we make them respect us ā now they are going to get their heads kicked inā.
Certainly some of NAās activities were designed, at the very least, to provoke a response, for example distributing pro-Nazi leaflets in major multicultural cities like Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool. NA held their first āwhite manā march in Newcastle in 2015 and aimed to repeat the activity elsewhere. Indeed, in Liverpool in 2015 NA threatened to start a ārace riotā, claiming āonly bullets will stop usā. Although, on the day NA activists were forced into an ignominious retreat, the NA website maintained that āby leafleting in the heart of a cosmopolitan metropolis, we have shown that no matter how radical the message or how multiracial the area, Nationalists have no reason to fear going out on the streets and spreading the messageā. National Action also organised āflash-mobsā on campuses and NA claimed to have a presence in some British Universities. This type of āpropaganda of the deedā afforded NA a significant tactical advantage because it effectively deprived the anti-fascist opposition of the opportunity to mobilise. Furthermore, the fact that NA was unconcerned about the reaction it received as a consequence of its activities, was most vividly illustrated when its members posted pictures of themselves on the internet giving Nazi salutes in the so-called ācorpse cellarā at Buchenwald concentration camp in May 2016. The mainstream media was used therefore, not in an attempt to seek approval or solicit wider support, but to instil fear and raise their political profile by shocking the sensibilities of the general public.
Clearly the emphasis in NA was on ābootsā not āsuitsā with a consistent, if controversial, message and a relatively high level of organisational competence. There is also evidence that, if left to their own devices, their tactics may well have moved well beyond the macho posturing of street confrontation. For instance, there was some discussion in NA circles, of the āone-man cellā as a āfunctioning instrumentā which reflected a need to convey the impression that NA was āa group of action not just wordsā intent on making a tangible impact on the political landscape. As NA put it: āto achieve our objectives we must at first use tactics such as those established by Louis Beamās model of Leaderless Resistance which encourages the adoption of a phantom cell structure rather than a tiered and hierarchical form of army. Beamās strategy needs to inform our initial engagements with the hegemonic forces who seek to suppress usā. Hence ālone wolfā attacks, which are notoriously difficult to prevent because the activist acts independently of leaders or movement, were explicitly encouraged in NA literature. In short, in the absence of popular support, the Nazi activist was encouraged to resort to the despairing bravado of the autonomous assassin in an effort to precipitate chaos and make a political point. As NA explained: āwe want things to get worse so that the system burns its bridgesā¦worse is betterā.
If we look more specifically at the political ideas and concepts articulated by National Action we can see that it sought to position itself with reference to the ideological heritage of fascism ā all the familiar Nazi ideological themes were evident in the NA credo. National Actionās ideology was self-evidently fascist and Nazi: romantic anti-rationalism, social Darwinism, aggressive nationalism (xenophobia), along with an emphasis on an authoritarian state and a disciplined society, the need for assertive dictatorial leadership, and the idea of a āthird wayā beyond communism and capitalism, were combined with an adherence to cultural/sociobiological racism ā with a heavy emphasis on anti-Semitism. All of these features appeared prominently in NA literature and the group were clearly fanatical exponents of the classical paradigm of Nazism, as outlined by Adolf Hitler. Occasionally the florid rhetoric afforded a glimpse of what might be in store, should NA ever have achieved a position of influence: āif it is possible for us to take power, as we believe, then the most desirable and effective way of dealing with the race problem is for it to be carried out through civil and legislative institutions ā the arms of the stateā but āinvoluntary repatriation or āethnic cleansingā is not without precedentā. The practical consequence of National Actionās blatantly anti-Semitic perspective was entirely predictable and articulated without obfuscation: āit is with glee that we will enact the final solution across Europeā. Such sentiments were bound to induce anxiety in anyone with the most cursory knowledge of contemporary European history.
However, although the ideological template was provided by classical forms of fascism (as expressed in practical terms in Germany between 1933-45) and therefore National Action can be legitimately described as an authentic organisational embodiment of Nazi ideology, its political praxis also clearly complied with the tradition of fascism in Britain. The infamous triptych of the British Union of Fascists (BUF), National Front (NF), and British National Party (BNP) were all manifestations of the fascist experience set in a specifically British context although they also acquired their ideological impetus from the ideas which animated the classical fascist movements and regimes on the continent between1922-45. Each of these organisations, in its own way, kept fascist ideas alive in Britain during onerous circumstances and in its own peculiar way, NA was attempting to perform precisely the same political task.
That NA is very much a part of the fascist tradition in Britain might be axiomatic, but it is also worth noting that they also had much broader influences as well, partly because they emphasised the need for a pan-European perspective. Hence NA had links with a variety of far-right organisations such as National Rebirth of Poland (NOP), Sigud and the Nordic Resistance Movement, White Rex and Wotan Jugend. There is also evidence of contact with the Ukrainian paramilitary group Azov Division. National Action was also inspired by the āsuccessā of the Jobbik movement in Hungary, and the impact made by Golden Dawn in Greece which āglitters tantalizingly on the horizonā, indeed NA admitted that āGolden Dawn in Greece are a perfect example of what weād like to replicateā.
It is also possible to discern other, more esoteric, ideological inspirations from Europe, such as the authoritarian impulses of Primo de Rivera and the Spanish Falange, Codreanuās Romanian Iron Guard, or the anti-rational mysticism of Julius Evola. Perhaps, given the fact that NA set itself a much wider cultural remit, a more pertinent and contemporary comparator might be Casa Pound in Italy, which began as a squatter organisation but developed into a social network in the Esquilino district of Rome and spread to other cities. Furthermore, it is important to note that the increasingly globalised and interconnected nature of the world definitely helps groups like NA develop new relationships with like-minded individuals and organisations ā this has precipitated dramatic changes in the scope and relevance of the broader āimaginedā community of fascist activists. Websites provide easy accessibility across national borders, and the internet facilitates direct contact between fascist ideologues in a way hardly imaginable to previous generations, therefore access to a plethora of explicitly Nazi ideas has never been easier.
Confrontation
Of course, active resistance to such organisations is imperative and fascism needs to be confronted both ideologically and physically. It is interesting to note that it was militant, street level anti-fascist activists who did most of the āheavy liftingā when confronting the British Union of Fascists in the 1930s, the National Front in the 1970s and the BNP in the 1980s and 90s. Physical force, used as a tactic rather than a principle, was used effectively to confront and deter those organisations trying to intimidate and divide people in local communities. Indeed, this approach has been successful in the very recent past. A similar effort to ācontrol the streetsā was attempted by Combat 18, which was formed by the BNP. Despite the pavement posturing reminiscent of contemporaneous āfootball firmsā C18 never actually fulfilled its pretentions. The BNP was, in effect, forced to āde-commission the bootā (as Nick Griffin and Tony Lecomber put it) due to the assiduous attention of groups likeĀ Anti-Fascist Action.
Eventually C18 was jettisoned by the BNP as a state-infiltrated embarrassment in 1994. Combat 18 subsequently degenerated into a drinking club for drug dealers and Hitler-worshipping fantasists. In actual fact National Action effectively acknowledged that it was itself formed, at least in part, as a reaction to this failure to control public space in the face of sustained anti-fascist resistance: āNational Action was formed in the face of adversity, in hate of the red terror that humbled and fell so many Nationalist groups before usā. Indeed, NA argued that āany group who is not working to actively combat these thugs is a non-starter because the group either gets suppressed, or they must self-marginalise their own activities to places where they have no effectā, therefore āwe must first break the red terrorā. So, NA itself was, in some ways, merely the latest effort to respond the success anti-fascist organisations have had in confronting fascists in Britain. Hence, despite its lofty ideological pretensions, NA were not so much the harbingers of a new national ārevolutionā, but the bitter bile produced after the fascist far right had digested the fact that they had been comprehensively defeated on the streets. This kind of resistance is entirely appropriate and necessary.
However, such a pro-active approach has been the subject of some considerable controversy recently with eminent intellectual Noam Chomsky questioning the utility of robust physical resistance against the (proto-fascist) Alt-Right in the USA. Of course, there are some powerful arguments which can be deployed against militant anti-fascist activists, and these tend to prioritise civil liberties and the right to freedom of speech. This is essentially the idea that fascist ideas can and should be exposed to the penetrating light of democratic debate. Rational people will, it is claimed, see through the lies and malevolent half-truths of fascist discourse and be convinced of the intellectual rigour of those advocating tolerance and freedom.
However, to prioritise liberal freedoms above political realities would be a fundamental mistake. We know, from historical experience, that fascists only use democracy in order to destroy it ā although they are perfectly willing to milk the Parliamentary cow before it gets butchered. Fascists use freedom of speech in order to destroy it, and fascism in practice leads inexorably toward dictatorship, coercion and concentration camps. Moreover, freedom of speech is a contingent liberty, and cannot be construed as an absolute right in all circumstances, and much depends upon political circumstances and social consequences. We all accept constraints on our freedom of speech for the common good, and some of these restrictions happen to be enshrined in law. No-one would seriously support the right of paedophiles to argue in favour of sex with children.
Moreover, given the historical and theoretical context, ordinary people in working class communities, where fascists try to incubate their grotesque ideology, have every right to resist ā indeed it becomes a moral obligation to do so, by all means necessary. A āno platformā position with regard to overtly fascist organisations is, therefore entirely legitimate, and force is, in some very specific circumstances, a viable and necessary option. This fact has been confirmed by the British experience of anti-fascism, which has always been successful in challenging fascists for the control of public space. In fact, in many ways those on the liberal left are guilty of the most asinine hypocrisy because, unless they are pacifists, everyone accepts the utility of violence in certain circumstances. Of course, the conventional liberal mantra that āviolence never solves anythingā would not survive a momentās serious reflection and is only ever selectively applied by its protagonists ā and it never seems to apply to those wielding the coercive power of the state. Moreover, in terms of recent history, it has often been liberals who have cynically used violence on a massive scale, whilst perpetrating illegal wars and colonial expeditions. Those of us who aspire to becoming part of a relevant (rather than āliberalā) left cannot afford to be squeamish about confronting the issue of physical resistance. Indeed, the failure to confront fascism effectively may consign us all to irrelevance.
Attraction
Now there is an even more disturbing aspect to all of this, which will undoubtedly unsettle the liberal intellectuals who study such things. Nazi ideology is threatening and dangerous because, to certain sections of the white working class, it can offer a far more satisfying and convincing credo than the austere individualism that underpins neo-liberalism. This assertion requires careful elaboration. Fascism can be attractive because it is a form of collectivism, which aims to transcend a sterile economic orthodoxy which focuses on the instrumental value of the individual consumer in the free market. One of the fundamental insights of fascist ideology was (is) the emphasis on the social dimension and its acknowledgement that people need to feel a sense of belonging, and that there is more to existence than autonomous agents cast adrift in the free market wilderness.
During difficult periods desperate people will seize on anything to provide an āexplanationā for their predicament and a prospect of respite. In fact, given the recent trajectory of economic decline in capitalist societies, for a growing number of people the actual material benefits of market-based freedoms are becoming far less obvious. The sense of purpose, devotion and dedication inspired by fascist ideology should therefore not be underestimated. Hence the Nazi ideal, dystopian though it undoubtedly is, nevertheless reflects an impulse to accommodate a collective consciousness which transcends existential atomisation and gives human existence a greater meaning. The fascists claim to be able to take everyone, minus the āotherā, to a better life, and this kind of rhetoric resonates in marginalised communities where progressive political aspirations have been seriously attenuated. It is therefore important to note that the dominant liberal orthodoxy, which had assumed that pluralistic, multicultural capitalism had ensured the permanent defeat of fascism, looks exceedingly threadbare in the context of fascist and right-wing populist successes across Europe and the USA.
However, the real threat of an authoritarian future may not come directly from the neo-fascist micro-groups, although they retain a clear capacity to damage the social fabric. The genuine danger may come from a creeping state authoritarianism and an erosion of human rights, which moves the body politic towards the ideological territory inhabited by the far right. When this occurs it makes it much easier for the noxious ideas of fascist micro-groups to gain traction. The state may be a complex (and sometimes contradictory) collection of institutions, organisations, processes and interactions (both repressive and ideological) but it is still possible to discern an overall strategic imperative or ādirection of travelā and an ostensibly liberal democratic state, which is unable to secure hegemony during a period of socio-economic and political crisis, may attempt to solve this dilemma by moving toward a more authoritarian, āexceptionalā dispensation. Here we must effectively acknowledge and assess the potential of this dynamic to exert much more coercive state power.
In fact we can discern this process now in the UK. The growth of officially sanctioned āIslamaphobiaā via counter-terrorism strategy, the expansion of the security agenda and the systematic erosion of civil liberties as a consequence of the so-called āwar on terrorā (which has necessitated the militarisation of the police, mass surveillance, secret courts, suspension of habeas corpus, extraordinary rendition, āblack siteā prisons, the use and justification of torture and extra-judicial assassination) all indicate unambiguously that the scope for a much more authoritarian version of liberal democracy is growing exponentially. All of this is, of course, underpinned by the sclerotic influence of secret state agencies which have honed their craft during the years of colonial subjugation, and which still remain largely unaccountable for their actions. This is why it is absolutely pointless to rely on the state to deal with fascism whilst it is itself moving in a proto-fascist direction.
Intervention
Thus, in such a context, the official ban imposed on National Action by the British government (which was wildly applauded by many liberals) may actually be counter-productive in terms of preventing fascism ā it will have little tangible effect on actual activists, who will simply engage in more clandestine activity, whilst the measure itself reflects the power of a state which has dramatically (and seemingly inexorably) enhanced its discretionary authority and coercive capability. It is interesting to note that the UKās Prevent strategy outlines a list of āBritish valuesā to be adhered to whilst in the USA the department of Homeland Security has already formally classified Antifa protests as ādomestic terrorist violenceā. Here, with the state effectively intervening to decide what is a ālegitimateā political perspective, we seem to be heading into an exceedingly dangerous area of jurisprudence, the logic of which presages the emergence of an āexceptional stateā that formally dispenses with the constraints upon central executive authority.
National Action may have articulated a genuinely nasty Nazi ideology, but the idea that state legislation is the best way to deal with the threat is a categorical error. By allowing the state to, in effect, determine the realm of āresponsibleā political discourse the āpopulistā parties of the right make it much easier for fascist ideas to gain traction. So such a state ban, aiming to prevent a āvile ideologyā in the name of liberal tolerance, can produce (in the longer term) precisely the opposite effect. Hence the ballot box, or the size of fascist organisations are not the only matrix by which we might measure the success of fascist ideology. Its not that the liberal damns will be breached by a tidal wave of fascist votes or that Nazi-micro-groups might metastasize, but that democratic values, institutions and processes are effectively eroded from within, thereby creating the conditions for fascist success in the future. The elliptical slide into a qualitatively different type of regime may be gradual and incremental and in this sense the fascist lunatics on the fringes of the political spectrum do not need to do very much because the practical policy output of the state, which reflects and sustains asymmetrical power relationships, is moving the ideological centre of gravity in their direction.
Thus, the liberal democratic state, deploying the rhetoric of āsecurityā, āsafetyā and āstabilityā moves inexorably toward an altogether more sinister proto-fascist formulation. It is always worth remembering that ultimately the stateās polycontextual function, despite its existence as a site of political struggle reflecting wider social contradictions, is to protect the material interests of the dominant class ā to ensure, more specifically, social stability and the economic conditions conducive to continued capital accumulation. It is also worth noting that in global terms, where free market capitalism is dominant, the authoritarian conception of the state is far more prevalent than the liberal democratic model. Capitalismās connection to democratic forms and structures is (and has always been) extremely tenuous and contingent upon a range of factors which are difficult to predict or control. There is no impenetrable wall of liberal tolerance separating conventional politics from fascism, despite the comforting assurances of politicians. Certainly the neo-liberal political project which emphasises āausterityā and āsecurityā has precipitated a dynamic which is driving democracy toward a more dictatorial form of state which attempts to (re)exert control by ossifying the balance of social forces in favour of capital.
Myths
Such an observation means that it is important to address explicitly the āfailure of fascismā thesis which asserts that fascism was comprehensively and permanently defeated in 1945. In fact in many ways the āfailure of fascismā hypothesis reflected the uncritical assimilation of a convenient cultural myth. The notion of fascist āfailureā tends to obscure the fact that fascism has made some significant progress, has set the political agenda and retains the capacity to do serious damage to the social fabric. The focus on the caricature villains of the fascist āotherā, with their swastikas and overt anti-Semitism enables society to ignore some of its own imperfections, and obscures the real relationship between Conservatism and fascism which is far more ambiguous than conventional wisdom suggests. This point is worth developing because a kind of anti-fascist myth exists in Britain, as a consequence of the war. The uncomfortable fact is that the war against Hitler (and Mussolini) reflected a desire to protect certain long-held strategic, geo-political and economic interests, rather than a conflict over ideological principle or morality.
In short, the British ruling class was drawn into an anti-fascist position by the foreign policy of Hitler, which posed a real threat to Britainās material interests. To put the point more bluntly, the war, from the British policy-making point of view, did not reflect any deeply held antipathy toward fascist ideology. Indeed, many members of the British ruling class expressed admiration for fascist ideas, and noted the various āachievementsā of fascist regimes. Certain sections of the British upper classes not only flirted shamelessly with fascism before the war, many Conservatives saw fascism as simply a more virile and robust expression of their own ideas. Even the Conservative partyās own āanti-fascistā warlord, Winston Churchill, is on record as expressing his admiration for both Hitler and Mussolini, and the dullards in the royal family would have undoubtedly supplied their very own Quisling or Petain, if the war had gone badly. The collaborators would undoubtedly have come from the Conservative elites and the Establishment.
So, in effect, the war in the West represented a conflict of interests rather than ideas (in contrast to the ideological war of annihilation in the East) ā it was a conflict conducted primarily against fascists rather than fascism. This dimension of the conflagration has, of course, been distorted by post-war reaction to the Holocaust, which revealed the evil essence of Nazism and precipitated a retrospective rationalisation by Conservative elements in Britain. This revision may have been an understandable reflex in response to Genocide, but it should not be allowed to obfuscate the real nature of the relationship between Conservatism, the ruling class and fascism. The reality is that it is the Conservative classes, the people with power and privilege, who are most likely to succumb to the fatal allure of fascism during a period of crisis, and the state itself may be seduced by solutions that have much more in common with fascism than liberal democracy.
Conclusion
The fact is that unrestrained capitalism makes it much more difficult to solve the problem of violent right-wing micro-groups because the economic system, which produces dramatic levels of social inequality, and which is systemically prone to intermittent cyclical crises, actually incubates the fascist contagion. In such an economic context there is an inevitable populist impulse to blame āimmigrantsā and ārefugeesā for resource scarcity. In such a conducive situation, the fascist far right offers seductively simplistic solutions to complex socio-economic problems. In response to this the liberal-left response has been worse than useless. Indeed, the stubborn liberal-left commitment to āidentity politicsā, which re-configures the āwhiteā working class as an ethnic category, actually plays into the hands of those stressing the significance of ethnicity. Fashionable post-modern cynicism about the utility of meta-narratives and collective action have not only hampered the left, they have underscored the preconceptions of the far right by prioritizing ethnicity. In effect, the contours of the ideological territory mapped out by some on the āpolitically correctā liberal left are familiar to fascists and easy to navigate. The separatism of āspecial interestsā therefore needs to be replaced by an analysis based primarily on āclassā, which actually means challenging the āsacred cowā of āmulticulturalismā.
Hence, those activists who focus entirely on the stubborn persistence of the pathological misfits and morons who inhabit the Nazi micro-groups, whilst ignoring the nature of the state and the socio-economic and political context within which such activity takes place, not only diminish our chance of understanding why these groups emerge, it effectively exonerates those who have been complicit in creating an environment within which such ideas and groups can flourish. There is an entirely understandable urge to recoil at the message conveyed by groups like National Action ā but they are unlikely to disappear completely unless the socio-political and economic environment which keeps producing such micro-groups is adequately addressed.
Indeed, disregarding the deeper contextual dimensions of fascist activity is not only an impediment to effective analysis, it is a pusillanimous dereliction of duty. Anti-fascists need to focus their strategy on the fascist organisations themselves, but also on the state/society which provides the context within which this conflict is being played out. In the āage of austerityā, where the attempt to re-impose neo-liberalism after the financial crisis has exposed the naked class interests which underpin the capitalist economic system, nothing is more important than understanding the precise nature of the threat posed by the far right because, as Bertold Brecht once remarked āthe bitch that gave birth to fascism is on heat againā!
NO PASARAN!
Mark Hayes started as an industrial labourer for British Shipbuilders in Woolston, Southampton in 1978. Whilst studying for a degree, he was given a short-term contract as a lecturer. Mark obtained a first class honours degree in politics from Portsmouth Polytechnic in 1984. He completed his PhD at the University of Southampton on the topic of the extreme right in British politics. Mark has published widely, including books, book chapters, journal articles, book reviews and commentary.
This article originally appeared at Freedom News and is republished with permission of the author.
107 CowgateĀ is run by volunteers and we need your support to survive. Please donate to help sustain the site and theĀ tours, conferences and other educational services we provide.Ā Donate HereĀ Now!
107 CowgateĀ On Social Media
OnĀ Twitter
OnĀ Facebook
Jim Slaven tweetsĀ @JimSlaven
107cowgate 